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We examine a principal-agent model with moral hazard in which the technology – the vector
of probability distributions from the agent’s actions to the possible outcomes – is initially un-
known. A signal correlated with the technology is observed after the principal and agent agree
to the contract (ex ante contracting). The signal may be uninformative (null information) or
informative and observed only by the principal (private information) or observed by both the
principal and agent (public information). We show that: (i) if the principal implements diﬀerent
actions for each signal with private information, then the principal strictly prefers both public
to private information and private to null information; (ii) if the principal implements the same
action for either signal with public information, then the principal is indiﬀerent between null
and private information, which she prefers to public information; (iii) the value of information
can be non-monotonic both with private and with public information; and (iv) the value of
information may be greater either with private or with public information.
KEYWORDS: Moral Hazard, Ex Ante Contracting, Informed Principal, Technology, Value of
Information. JEL Classiﬁcation: D82, D86.
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A standard paradigm in contract theory is the principal-agent model with moral hazard. A risk
neutral principal hires a risk averse agent to undertake an action; the outcome is the realization of
a random variable with a probability distribution conditional upon the agent’s action. Because this
action is unobservable by the principal, the principal makes a payment to the agent conditional
upon the realized outcome; the incentive scheme must both impose risk on the agent in order to
induce him to take the appropriate action and provide the agent at least his reservation utility.
Several studies have extended this basic model to allow the agent or the principal to have
private information at the contracting date.1 Others have compared situations where one or both
players obtain information after the contract has been oﬀered; however, they do not consider how
the timing of information aﬀects the tradeoﬀ between incentive and utility provisions.2
That is, there are situations in which, after obtaining information, the principal wants to im-
plement diﬀerent actions and possibly provide diﬀerent expected utilities. For instance, when a
ﬁrm hires a manager to head operations in a new market, the ﬁrm may not have information about
local demand and the returns to the manager’s diﬀerent actions. Also, in the ROTC, cadets enlist
and are committed to the corps. Their assignment upon graduation depends upon the needs of
the military four years after enlistment, needs that were uncertain when the cadet enlisted.3 Ad-
ditionally, government procurement contracts often involve the winning ﬁrm having to modify the
project as more information is obtained.
We examine a principal-agent model with moral hazard and unknown technology – the vector
of conditional probability distributions from the agent’s action to the outcomes. It aﬀects the costs
to implement an action and the resulting revenues. After the contracting date, a signal is observed;
it is correlated with the technology that the principal has. The signal is either uninformative (null
information) or informative; if it is informative, then either only the principal observes it (private
1For the former, see for example Holmstr¨ om (1979), Myerson (1982), and Sobel (1993); for the latter, see for
example Myerson (1983), Maskin and Tirole (1992), Inderst (2001), and Chade and Silvers (2002).
2See for example Lewis and Sappington (1997), Lizzeri et al (2002), Ederer (2009), and Nafziger (2009). In each,
the agent is risk neutral and the payments are set solely to provide incentives to exert a particular action – i.e., there
is no tradeoﬀ between incentive and utility provisions.
3During their training periods, they select preferences of job assignment (e.g., aviation or military intelligence)
and undergo interim evaluations. Moreover, pay depends upon job and location; promotion and career prospects
depend upon these and upon how hard the cadet works.
1information) or also the agent observes it (public information). We determine the consequences for
the actions implemented and equilibrium payoﬀs, both between null, private, and public informa-
tion, and within private and public as the signal is more informative (better information).
We show that: (i) if the principal implements a diﬀerent action for each signal with private
information, then the principal prefers public to private information and private to null information;
(ii) if the principal implements the same action for each signal with public information, then the
principal is indiﬀerent between null and private information and prefers either to public information;
(iii) both the value of better public and better private information can be non-monotonic; and (iv)
when the principal implements a diﬀerent action for each signal, the value of better information may
be greater either with private or with public information. The second point implies that the value
of public information vis-´ a-vis null information can be negative, even if the principal implements
diﬀerent actions for each signal.
Our work adds to the growing literatures on the timing of information, the symmetry of infor-
mation, and the value of better information. The timing and symmetry of information together
determine whether the principal can insure against the possibility of having a high cost to implement
an action and whether or not the agent can hold pessimistic beliefs about which technology the
principal has. Consequently, for each action, they aﬀect the tradeoﬀ between providing incentives
and utility to the agent, and thereby aﬀect the cost to implement the proﬁle of actions.
Regarding the timing of information, by obtaining information sooner, a principal can tailor
the action that she induces the agent to take to the state of the world. However, this often makes
it more costly to induce the agent to undertake any action, particularly if the information is public
– see, e.g., Lizzeri et al (2002), Ederer (2009), and Nafziger (2009). As in these papers, our results
show that the principal prefers information to arrive later; however, this arises even when the agent
observes the signal before he chooses his action. Moreover, our results arise for a diﬀerent reason;
rather than save on incentive provision, the principal is able to reduce cost by trading oﬀ utility
provision.
In Demski and Sappington (1987), the timing is similar to the timing in our model in that an
uninformed principal oﬀers an uninformed agent a contract, then a signal is observed, and then
the agent takes an action. However, they consider the agent, not Nature, choosing the information
structure, and the signal is private to the agent, not either private to the principal or public. The
principal provides diﬀerent expected utilities in order to provide incentives for the agent to acquire
2an informative signal and in so doing, induces moral hazard with respect to the action when it is
otherwise absent; whereas in our model, the principal provides diﬀerent expected utilities in order
to reduce costs of providing incentives for the agent to choose the desired actions, when moral
hazard is already present.
Regarding the symmetry of information, in contrast to the model we examine, suppose that
the principal has private information at the contracting date. Myerson (1983) showed that the
principal does best by withholding the private information until after the agent either accepts
or rejects the contract; nevertheless, as Maskin and Tirole (1992) showed, a privately informed
principal may not attain her complete information payoﬀ. These results arise because the principal
oﬀers the contract after she has obtained information; thus, the agent may hold pessimistic beliefs
that preclude certain contracts from being oﬀered. As such, the principal generally prefers public
information (see also Mezzetti and Tsoulouhas, 2000). In contrast with these, in our model the
principal may prefer private to public information, even complete public information.
Lastly, Gjesdal (1982, Proposition 3) showed that the value of better information can be negative
for the principal. This arises when imposing risk on the agent (through an incentive scheme that
makes a random payment given the outcome) can implement a higher action at the same cost.4
Gjesdal considered information that is related to the action the agent chose; i.e., better information
yields greater control over the agent’s action, which is endogenous. We obtain a similar result,
but in a diﬀerent context; when the information is related to the principal’s technology – i.e.,
better information implies greater correlation between the signal and an exogenous parameter –
implementing the same action may become more or less expensive with better information. The
convexity is in the cost to implement an action.
Intuitively, better information reduces risk-sharing possibilities and, when information is private,
increases both the expected cost to implement an action and the cost to separate, but allows the
principal to implement actions that are closer to ﬁrst-best. This last eﬀect may harm, rather than
beneﬁt, the principal – better information may deter her from implementing a higher action when
she observes a signal correlated with the technology that has a higher cost to implement that action.
With ex ante contracting, the principal is able to trade oﬀ the expected utilities she provides for
each signal of the technology, but if information is public, she faces a riskier gamble of the cost of
4Although the agent is risk averse, if his coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion is decreasing as he chooses a higher
action, then it is possible that randomizing his payment induces him to choose a higher action, which yields the
principal greater beneﬁts, with which she can compensate the agent for his increased risk, and both are better oﬀ.
3providing incentives. Thus, the value of better information may be positive or negative, and may
be larger or smaller with public than with private information.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, the model is laid out. The results are presented
in Section 3, ﬁrst for private information and then for public information. In Section 4, we examine
the robustness of the results. In Section 5, we discuss two features that are central to our framework:
the timing of contracting and the importance of commitment. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Preferences, Actions, and Technologies
The agent is a risk-averse expected-utility maximizer with additively separable von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function over payment and action, given by U(w,a) = V (w)−a, with V ′(w) >
0,V ′′(w) < 0; ∃w such that limw↓wV ′(w) = ∞. Deﬁne h ≡ V −1( ). He chooses an action a ∈
{a1,...,aM} where 0 < a1 < a2 < ... < aM < ∞ and M ≥ 2. The action speciﬁes a probability
distribution over the possible outcomes qn ∈ {q1,...,qN} where 0 < q1 < q2 < ... < qN < ∞ and
N ≥ 2. The technology is the vector of probability distributions for each of the agent’s actions.
The principal is risk-neutral and oﬀers the agent a contract. She is endowed with one of two
technologies, Π1 or Π2. For k ∈ {1,2}, Πk = {πk(a1),...,πk(aM)} where πk(a) is the conditional
probability distribution; thus, πkn(a) is the conditional probability that qn is realized. We make
no assumption about the ordering of technologies regarding expected costs, beneﬁts, or proﬁts.
The results hold whether one technology is preferred to the other only for some actions or for all
actions.5 Let λ ∈ (0,1) be the prior probability that the principal has Π1.
5For example, if Π1 is generated from Π2 by a mean-preserving spread in the likelihood ratio distribution function,
then the principal prefers Π1 to Π2 in that she can implement any action at a lower cost (Kim, 1995); if Π1 ﬁrst-order
stochastically dominates (FOSD) Π2, then she prefers Π1 to Π2 in that each action yields her greater beneﬁts. We
can think of the FOSD ranking in an employer-employee context as Π1 corresponding to a more productive employee
– for any action, employee Π1 is more likely to realize a greater output than is Π2. It is not uncommon that a worker
does not know his own productivity, but the employer can become justiﬁably more certain of this through interviews
and interim evaluations.
42.2 Information
Nature sends a signal, zk ∈ {z1,z2} correlated with the technology. For both technologies, there is
a probability distribution described by the single parameter ζ ∈ [0.5,1], which is the conditional
probability that zk is sent if she has Πk. This pair of probability distributions is called an infor-
mation structure. If ζ = 0.5, the signal is uninformative and the principal and agent have null
information. If ζ > 0.5, the signal is informative; if only the principal observes it, then she has
private information, but if both she and the agent observe it, then they have public information.
Lastly, as the signal is more informative (ζ increases), information is better.
Now, deﬁne the following three environments:
• Null Information: ζ = 0.5;
• Private Information: ζ ∈ (0.5,1] and only the principal observes zk; and
• Public Information: ζ ∈ (0.5,1] and both the principal and agent observe zk.
After she observes zk, the principal updates her beliefs, denoted by ρ
pr
k , about the technology.




prob(z1) is the probability that the principal has Π1 conditional upon observing





the probability that the principal has Π1 conditional upon observing z2, where prob(z2) = λ(1−ζ)+
(1−λ)ζ is the probability of observing z2. The agent also updates his beliefs, denoted by ρag, about
the technology; in Public Information, ρag = ρag(k) = ρ
pr
k , but in Private Information, ρag = ρag(k′)
depends upon the principal’s possibly false announcement zk′ of the signal she observed.
Let Pk = {p(a1;k),...,p(aM;k)} denote the principal’s type when her beliefs are ρ
pr
k , where
p(a;k) are her expected conditional probability distributions. Then, the expected conditional proba-
bility that qn is realized is pn(a;k). Similarly, let p(a;ρag) and pn(a;ρag) denote the agent’s expected
conditional probability distribution and probability that qn is realized.
2.3 Timings
Our objectives are to compare and contrast the resulting Perfect Bayesian Equilibria, both between
Null, Private, and Public Information, and within Private and Public Information as information is
better. These comparisons are made when the principal oﬀers the agent a contract prior to the sig-
nal being observed. The agent accepts this contract if and only if it yields expected utility at least
5his reservation utility ¯ U. We call this contract an ex ante contract and denote it by I; it is a menu
of announcement-contingent contracts, each of which speciﬁes a payment from the principal to the
agent contingent upon the realized outcome. The principal designs each announcement-contingent
contract in order to implement an action; the operative announcement-contingent contract is de-
termined either by the principal’s announcement (Private Information) or by the publicly observed
signal (Public Information).
These environments are summarized in the following timelines. In each, if the agent (ag) rejects
the contract, then the game ends and the agent receives ¯ U while the principal (pr) receives 0. For
k,k′ ∈ {1,2}, where k′ may or may not equal k, the timings in these ex post contracting games are





















ag updates ρag = ρag(k) = ρ
pr
k
Note that ρag(k′) depends upon the principal’s announcement, which may not be truthful.6 The
timing of Null Information can be given by either, as ρ
pr
k = λ so that ρag( ) = λ for both zk.
2.4 Contracts and Constraints
If the principal announces zk, let In(k) denote the outcome-contingent payment from the princi-
pal to the agent, with In(k) ∈ ℜ ∀n ∈ {1,...,N}. Then I(k) = {I1(k),...,IN(k)} we call an
announcement-contingent contract and the ex ante contract is I = {I(1),I(2)}.
An announcement-contingent contract I(k) is incentive compatible for the agent if it induces
6Our ex ante contract is similar to the contract in Maskin and Tirole (1992) in that it is a menu of compensation
schemes, and the operative one is determined only after the agent accepts the menu. One key diﬀerence is that in
Maskin and Tirole, the principal already has private information when she oﬀers this menu.
6the agent to choose a that satisﬁes a ∈ argmax
a∈{a1,...,aM}
 N




[pn(a;ρag) − pn(˜ a;ρag)]V (In(k)) ≥ a − ˜ a,
with ρag = ρag(k). We will also say that I(k) implements a if it satisﬁes (1) with ρag = ρag(k).
If the principal implements a > a1, the announcement-contingent contract must satisfy (1). If
she implements a1, she does so with the constant payment ¯ w = h(¯ U + a1).
The announcement-contingent contract I(k) that implements a yields the agent an interim
expected utility denoted by uk = EU(I(k)) =
 N
n=1 pn(a;ρag)V (In(k)) − a with ρag = ρag(k).
By making the acceptance/rejection decision prior to learning anything about the principal’s
type, each announcement-contingent contract need not yield expected utility ¯ U, but rather the ex
ante contract needs to satisfy individual rationality. An ex ante contract is individually rational if
it yields the agent at least ¯ U:
(2) prob(z1)u1 + prob(z2)u2 ≥ ¯ U.
Denote by Bk(a) the expected beneﬁt (revenue) for Pk from implementing a: Bk(a) =
 N
n=1 pn(a;k)qn.
Pk’s proﬁt from implementing a1 is Bk(a1) − ¯ w. Similarly, for any k,k′ ∈ {1,2}, denote by
Ck(I(k′);a) the expected cost for Pk to implement a with I(k′): Ck(I(k′);a) =
 N
n=1 pn(a;k)In(k′).
In Private Information, the agent does not observe the signal; thus, the principal can announce
a diﬀerent signal than she observed. The ex ante contract is incentive compatible for the principal
if, for each zk, the principal has the incentive to truthfully announce zk. Pk′ announces truthfully
if and only if
Bk′(a′) − Ck′(I(k′);a′) ≥ Bk′(a) − Ck′(I(k);a),
where I(k′) implements a′ and I(k) implements a. Denote this constraint by PICkk′. An ex
ante contract is incentive compatible if it is both incentive compatible for the principal and both
announcement-contingent contracts are incentive compatible for the agent.
2.5 Equilibrium Contracts
We call a pair of actions that the principal implements, {a(z1),a(z2)}, an action proﬁle.










In Public Information, {I(1),I(2)} is feasible if I(1) implements a(z1), I(2) implements a(z2), and
together they satisfy (2). In Private Information, {I(1),I(2)} is feasible if additionally, they satisfy
PIC12 and PIC21. The solution yields C1(I(1);a(z1)) and C2(I(2);a(z2)).
Then the principal selects the action proﬁle that yields the greatest proﬁt; i.e.,




In Public Information, let a∗∗(zk) denote the action that the principal implements in the proﬁt-
maximizing proﬁle if she observes zk and the ex ante contract is feasible. Let I∗∗(k) denote the




n (k))−a∗∗(zk) is the agent’s expected utility from I∗∗(k). The solution
to (3) is then an ex ante contract {I∗∗(1),I∗∗(2)}.
Because the principal is able to tradeoﬀ utility provision, it is worthwhile distinguishing the
proﬁt-maximizing actions and announcement-contingent contracts from those when the principal
is unable to tradeoﬀ utility provision; denote these by a∗(zk) and I∗(k) when u∗∗
k = ¯ U.
In Private Information, we assume that, without loss of generality, I∗∗(1) cannot be part of
an ex ante contract since PIC12 would be violated.7 Let ˆ ˆ I(1) denote the corresponding least-
cost announcement-contingent contract in the optimal (and feasible) ex ante contract. ˆ ˆ I(1) clearly





2 ). Let ˆ I(1) denote ˆ ˆ I(1) when u1 = ¯ U.
Because the principal solves a minimization problem and, at the contracting date, she has no
private information, the agent does not update his beliefs upon obtaining the contract oﬀer; thus,
the ex ante contract yields unique expected payoﬀs. It is possible that the principal is indiﬀerent
7Because the technology does not satisfy the single-crossing property, it is also possible that I
∗∗(2) cannot be part
of an ex ante contract since PIC21 could be violated.
8between two ex ante contracts, but then they would yield her the same proﬁt, and, as Lemma 1
below shows, the agent is also indiﬀerent.
The characteristics of the possible equilibrium ex ante contracts are relegated to Appendix 7.1.
3 Results
Intuitively, it is helpful to think of contracting in principal-agent models with moral hazard as
utility provision subject to the agent’s incentive compatibility constraints. For a given action
proﬁle, the principal wants to minimize the cost to provide utility, by choosing from the two sets
of announcement-contingent contracts that are incentive compatible for the agent. With ex ante
contracting, the principal compares the marginal costs of utility provision for each announcement-
contingent contract; the lower is the marginal cost of utility provision to implement an action given
a signal, the more utility that the principal provides in the corresponding announcement-contingent
contract.
In the ﬁrst subsection we derive a couple lemmae, the second of which clariﬁes the nature of
the risk that the principal faces to implement a constant action proﬁle. In the second subsection,
we explore the consequences for the principal when she has private information. By ﬁrst examining
the principal’s choice when ζ = 0.5, and then when ζ > 0.5, we are able to characterize the possible
payoﬀ functions. An increase in ζ from 0.5 has two eﬀects: information becomes both better
and asymmetric. In the third subsection, we perform the same analysis for the situation when
information is public. Contrasting the two allows us to disentangle the two eﬀects.
3.1 Preliminaries
We ﬁrst show that, with ex ante contracting, the agent is indiﬀerent between the environments since
if an ex ante contract ever yielded more than ¯ U, there exists a less expensive ex ante contract that
implements the same action proﬁle, is incentive compatible for the principal, and is individually
rational.
Throughout, assume that the minimum payment from each announcement-contingent contract
is strictly greater than w. Proofs of all lemmae and propositions are in Appendix 7.2.
Lemma 1 Agent’s Utility
For any environment, every equilibrium ex ante contract yields the agent exactly ¯ U.
9Suppose that one announcement-contingent contract, I(k), had a minimum payment equal to
w. Then this announcement-contingent contract could provide more than ¯ U at its optimum because
in order to be incentive compatible for the agent, the payment structure yields an expected utility
greater than ¯ U. The agent may still receive only ¯ U, however, if the other announcement-contingent
contract can be adjusted to provide less than ¯ U. Only if in this other announcement-contingent
contract, I(k′), the minimum payment also equals w or if PICkk′ binds, would the agent receive
more than ¯ U from the equilibrium ex ante contract.
The primary impact of Lemma 1 is that the principal’s preferences for null, private, or public
information, or for better or worse information, depend upon how the diﬀerent information aﬀects
the costs to implement an action proﬁle and, thereby, the desirable action proﬁle. As we shall see,
whether the action proﬁle is constant or not aﬀects the principal’s preferences for private or public
information. When the principal implements a constant action proﬁle, she gains by trading oﬀ
incentive provision in Private Information, or by trading oﬀ utility provision in Public Information.
To see these, ﬁrst note that if she faces a risk with negative expected return, then she gains by
insuring herself if she can; i.e., the principal implements a constant action proﬁle at a lower expected
cost and provides the agent the same expected utility by oﬀering a pooling ex ante contract. Before
the contracting date, if information is public, the principal faces the risk over the possible costs
to implement the action.8 Even though the principal is risk neutral, this risk has a negative
expected return since the cost reduction is smaller than the cost increase. As Lemma 1 shows, the
agent receives the same expected utility from any ex ante contract. Thus, any non-pooling ex ante
contract imposes a mean-utility preserving increase in risk on the agent; such a gamble has a higher
expected cost (see Diamond and Stiglitz, 1974).
More speciﬁcally, before the contracting date, when information is public, the agent faces a
gamble over both the contract and the outcomes. This gamble is a spread of the contract over
only the outcomes, which is the pooling contract that he could receive if the agent is uninformed.
If the agent is uninformed, the principal can implement a with an incentive scheme that is not
as high-powered as when the agent believes she has, without loss of generality, Π2, but is more
high-powered as when he believes she has Π1. The agent’s risk aversion implies that the incentive
scheme is becoming more high-powered at an increasing rate as the likelihood ratio distribution
8If the technologies are related as in Kim (1995) or by a Blackwell ordering, then C1(I
∗(1);a) < C2(I
∗(2);a) holds
for all a. All we need is that these costs are unequal for the action under consideration (see also Grossman and Hart,
1983, Proposition 13).
10functions become more similar to those of Π2. The next lemma establishes this point.
Lemma 2 Expected Cost: Null vs Public Information
The expected cost of public information contracts for Pk and Pk′ with probabilities prob(zk) and
prob(zk′) is greater than the cost of a pooling contract, I∗(λ).
Through a series of mean-utility preserving spreads, one can generate a prob(zk′) : prob(zk)
gamble on I∗∗(k′) and I∗∗(k), from I∗(λ). If Y
d = x + ǫ where E[ǫ | x] = 0, then the distribution
induced by Y is a mean-preserving spread of the distribution induced by x. In our context, the
utilities V (I∗∗
n (k′)) and V (I∗∗
n (k)), are the utility V (I∗∗
n (λ)) plus noise that has zero conditional
expected mean. This generates a spread of the distribution induced by I(λ) and p(a;λ). Note
as well that the prob(zk′) : prob(zk) gamble on I∗∗(k′) and I∗∗(k) yields ¯ U as does I∗(λ). Thus,
both conditions of being a mean-utility preserving increase in risk are satisﬁed. Then, the agent’s
risk aversion implies that the expected cost of I∗∗(k′) and I∗∗(k) exceeds the expected cost of the
announcement-contingent contract I∗(λ).
Lastly, note that it is possible for the principal to implement a non-constant action proﬁle in Null
Information (see Example 3). Since the ex ante contract would be as in Public Information, for the
comparisons of Null against Private or Public Information, assume that the principal implements
a constant action proﬁle.
3.2 Private Information
In a standard contracting game, the compensation scheme that the principal oﬀers (or selects)
determines the agent’s incentives, which determine the action he chooses or the type he reports;
when the principal has private information, the contracting game becomes a signaling game, in
which the compensation scheme also signals the principal’s private information to the agent (and
thereby aﬀects his incentives). Our ex ante contracting game with private information diﬀers
from this signaling game in that, while the principal (the privately informed sender) selects the
announcement-contingent contract (the signal), the signal space, rather than exogenous, is endoge-
nous – it is the ex ante contract.
The timing diﬀers from that in Maskin and Tirole (1992) importantly in that in their paper, the
principal is informed, rather than uninformed when she oﬀers the contract. They showed that, as
a consequence, the agent may hold pessimistic beliefs that prevent the principal from realizing her
11complete information payoﬀ;9 whereas, in our current setting, the agent cannot hold pessimistic
beliefs upon receiving the ex ante contract.10
Then, in contrast with Maskin and Tirole (1992), that the agent’s beliefs are the same as the
principal’s at the contracting date allows the principal to do at least as well with private as with
null information. We establish this in our ﬁrst proposition below. That the agent’s beliefs may
diﬀer from the principal’s after learning her announcement implies that the principal may prefer
public to private information. We establish this in Proposition 3 in the next subsection.
If the principal implements a constant action proﬁle, then she pools if this is feasible. It is
feasible if the agent has not observed zk. In such situations, the principal is not hurt by obtaining
private information.
Proposition 1 Null vs. Private Information
The principal weakly prefers Private Information to Null Information; if the optimal action
proﬁle in Private Information is not constant, the preference is strict.
For example, consider a ﬁrm that wants to transfer a manager, who is currently contracted with
the ﬁrm, to head operations in a new market. It will pay to learn the value of higher actions by
the manager, if it would want the manager to choose diﬀerent actions (e.g., if the returns depend
upon the sensitivity of demand), even if the manager would not know the value of his actions. In
the next subsection, we show that the ﬁrm would gain even more if the manager would learn this.
Under Null Information, the principal implements a constant action proﬁle with I∗(λ). Under
Private Information, she can implement the same action for either signal by oﬀering an ex ante
contract consisting only of I∗(λ); by doing so, the principal guarantees that the agent’s beliefs after
her announcement are still ρag(I∗(λ)) = λ. If the principal chooses to implement a non-constant
action proﬁle, then she is necessarily better oﬀ. Moreover, the principal can gain by insuring
herself against the possibility of observing the signal correlated with the technology that has a
9In their model, the principal and agent have private information about diﬀerent parameters; however, the agent
makes his report simultaneously with the principal’s selection of the compensation scheme, so that this selection
cannot inﬂuence the agent’s incentives. Nevertheless, there exist equilibria in which the principal oﬀers a contract
that is more expensive than that with complete information. The agent’s out-of-equilibrium beliefs for contracts that
yield her her complete information payoﬀ are such that the principal is believed to be the low type; this prevents the
principal from oﬀering this contract since the agent would reject it.
10After the principal selects the announcement-contingent contract, the agent updates his beliefs, which may induce
him to choose an action diﬀerent from what he would choose if information were public.
12greater expected marginal cost of utility provision in the action proﬁle; she does this by trading oﬀ
both incentive and utility provisions between the announcement-contingent contracts. As Example
2 makes clear, the principal obtaining private information is crucial to her gaining by trading oﬀ
incentive provision; as shown in Section 5, information arriving after the contracting date is crucial
to her gaining by trading oﬀ utility provision.
Consider now Private Information and the impact of better private information. Gjesdal (1982)
deﬁned two ways that better information can beneﬁt the principal: (i) it can allow better risk-
sharing and so have marginal insurance value; and (ii) it can induce the principal to implement a
diﬀerent action proﬁle, and so have marginal incentive informativeness.
The marginal insurance value of better private information depends upon two factors: the
changes to the probabilities of observing each signal, and the marginal costs of utility provision
from each signal. When determining the value of information, it is standard to ﬁx the probabilities
of observing each signal. This leaves the changes in the marginal costs of utility provision for a
given action proﬁle. Since the expected cost to implement one action and provide the same utility
increases, the expected cost to implement an action proﬁle may increase, even though the principal
can adjust the expected utilities that each announcement-contingent contract provides.
As to marginal incentive informativeness, this need not be positive. If with better information,
she still implements a constant action proﬁle, then there is no marginal incentive informative-
ness.11 However, since better information increases the expected cost to implement a(zk′), the
principal may implement a diﬀerent action proﬁle with a lower action given zk′, thereby receiving
less expected revenue. Thus, the analysis following Lemma 2 shows that the value of better pri-
vate information is non-negative if the principal implements a constant action proﬁle with worse
information (Proposition 2) but otherwise may be positive or negative (Example 1).
Consider ﬁrst the value of better private information when the principal implements a constant
action proﬁle with worse. To be clear about the marginal insurance value, note that Lemma 2
implies that, when λ = 0.5:
(5) 0.5C1(I∗∗(1);a) + 0.5C2(I∗∗(2);a) > Cλ(I∗(λ);a).
11As in the proof of Proposition 1, simple algebra shows that if prob(z1|ζ) = prob(z2|ζ) = 0.5 and a(z1) = a(z2),
then prob(z1|ζ)B1|ζ(a(z1))+prob(z2|ζ)B2|ζ(a(z2)) is constant with respect to ζ; otherwise, the expected revenue from
{a(z1),a(z2)} may increase or decrease with ζ.
13The left-hand side equals the principal’s ex ante expected cost of implementing a since prob(z1) =
prob(z2) = 0.5. Not only is the cost of utility provision for a given type convex in the amount of
utility provided, but also (5) shows that the ability of the principal to trade oﬀ utility provision
still does not reduce her cost below that of the pooling contract.12
We are now ready to state our second main result, which does not require that λ = 0.5.
Proposition 2 Value of Better Private Information
Consider Private Information. For 1 ≥ ζ > ζ′, if the principal implements {a,a} for a > a1
with ζ′, then her equilibrium proﬁt with ζ is weakly greater than that with ζ′.
As in the analysis following Proposition 1, when the principal obtains private information, she
cannot do worse than implementing a constant action proﬁle, so that better information increases
her expected proﬁt if it induces her to implement a non-constant action proﬁle.
Now, suppose that the principal implements a non-constant action proﬁle with private informa-
tion. The value of better information may be negative. This could follow if either her expected cost
to implement the same action proﬁle increases, or she implements a lower action upon observing
one of the signals. Note that when the principal implements a non-constant action proﬁle, she
must oﬀer a separating ex ante contract. Suppose that the principal oﬀers {ˆ ˆ I(1),I∗∗(2)}, where
ˆ ˆ I(1) dissuades P2 from mimicking.13 ˆ ˆ I(1) necessarily costs her more than I∗∗(1) costs – if they
provide the same level of utility.
To see how the value of better information can be negative, consider ﬁrst the eﬀect on expected
costs of an increase in ζ, which causes a spread of ρ
pr
k . If the principal does not adjust the
amounts of utility she provides for each of her announcements, then her expected cost of the public
information contracts would increase. However, the public-information contracts are not feasible;
the principal must adjust one announcement-contingent contract to dissuade mimicking. This
separation cost may also increase with better information if the principal incentive compatibility
constraint becomes more diﬃcult to satisfy.14 That the principal can adjust the amounts of utility
12The incentive compatibility constraints become easier to satisfy for one type but more diﬃcult to satisfy for the
other type. These generate a less (respectively, more) high-powered incentive scheme, but the latter eﬀect dominates
the former eﬀect.
13Since we assume no ordering of the technologies, this is without loss of generality; i.e., for some other action
proﬁle, it may be P2 who must dissuade P1 from mimicking.
14This can happen because, although an increase in ρ
pr
1 and a decrease in ρ
pr
2 each lower the signaling cost, which
is smaller as |
pn(a;1)
pn(a;2) − 1| increases, P2 would have more to gain, and therefore would mimic some contracts that she












Figure 1: Principal’s Payoﬀ Function With Private Information: Principal Pools for ζ ∈ [0.5, ˆ ζPrI)
she provides, mitigates but need not overcome these eﬀects. Thus, the expected cost to implement
the same action proﬁle may increase or decrease.
Second, any change in the costs to implement an action proﬁle may induce her to implement a
diﬀerent action proﬁle. However, as before, this could lower her expected revenue.
These eﬀects are evidenced in Figure 1, which depicts the principal’s payoﬀ in Example 1 as a
function of ζ. The red, green, and blue payoﬀ functions correspond to the action proﬁles {a2,a2},
{a3,a2}, and {a3,a1}; the solid portions indicate the upper envelope of these payoﬀ functions. As
ζ increases, when the marginal incentive informativeness ﬁrst exceeds the marginal insurance value
(if this is negative) plus the signaling cost, the principal implements a non-constant action proﬁle.
Denote the smallest value of ζ at which the principal is indiﬀerent between implementing a constant
action proﬁle and a non-constant action proﬁle, by ˆ ζPrI (0.673 in the example).15 The value of
better information is the slope of this function, except at ζ = 0.5 – recall that for ζ = 0.5, an
increase in ζ not only yields better information, but also makes it asymmetric.
Example 1 Non-Monotonic Value of Better Private Information
The agent has log utility, disutility of action a ∈ {0.8,2,5}, and reservation utility ¯ U = 1. The
would not with worse information.
15It is possible for the principal to implement a constant action proﬁle for some ζ > ˆ ζ
PrI, since the expected
revenues change at a constant rate for any action proﬁle, but the cost diﬀerence between alternative ex ante contracts
may rise or fall with ζ.

























, with λ = 0.5. In Private Information, the principal optimally implements:
• {a2,a2} for ζ ∈ [0.5, ˆ ζPrI] – her expected proﬁt is 4159.19;
• {a3,a2} for ζ ∈ [ˆ ζPrI,0.941] – her expected proﬁt increases to 4427.42 at ζ = 0.86 and then
decreases, reaching 4338.98 at ζ = 0.941; and
• {a3,a1} for ζ ∈ [0.941,1] – her expected proﬁt increases monotonically to 4614.81 at ζ = 1.16
To complete the characterization of the principal’s payoﬀ function, consider the possibility that
the principal implements the non-constant action proﬁle {a(z1),a(z2)} at ζ = 0.5. This could be
optimal since she can implement {a(z1),a(z2)} at a lower expected cost than the expected cost
of the constant action proﬁles {a(z1),a(z1)} and {a(z2),a(z2)}, but the expected revenues are the
same. This arises because the principal can trade oﬀ utility provision. If such were the case, then
there would then be a downward jump discontinuity in the payoﬀ function, as for any ζ > 0.5, one
of the principal incentive compatibility constraints would bind, resulting in a discrete increase in
expected cost.
To summarize this subsection, if the principal implements a constant action proﬁle with ζ′ ≥ 0.5,
the marginal incentive informativeness is non-negative. Even though both the marginal insurance
value is negative and possibly exacerbated by an increase to ζ > 0.5, the principal would not have
to pay more in expectation, unless the value due to marginal incentive informativeness exceeds the
increase in expected cost. Alternatively, if she were to implement a non-constant action proﬁle
with ζ′, then both the marginal insurance value and the marginal incentive informativeness of an
increase to ζ can be positive or negative; moreover, the cost of separating can decrease or increase.
16Solutions were computed for ζ ∈ [0.5,1] incrementing by 0.01. The values of ζ at which the principal changes the
optimal action proﬁle are rounded to the nearest thousandth.
163.3 Public Information
The previous subsection considered private information. Lemma 2 shows that, before the contract-
ing date, the agent’s risk aversion implies that the principal faces a gamble that is declining in
expected value with better public information. Unlike with private information, with public in-
formation, the principal is precluded from oﬀering the pooling contract, and thus from completely
insuring herself against having a higher cost to implement the action. This will certainly make
her worse oﬀ if she implements a constant action proﬁle; she will still be able to trade oﬀ utility
provision, but not incentive provision.
However, if she implements a non-constant action proﬁle, then she does best by not having to
pay a signaling cost and there is no loss from being unable to trade oﬀ incentive provision since this
is impossible when she separates with private information. Proposition 3 below shows this, namely,
that public information has negative value for the principal if (but not only if) she implements a
constant action proﬁle.
Two main diﬀerences arise with respect to private information. First, for ζ slightly larger than
0.5, the cost of separation to diﬀerent actions may exceed the revenue gains, so that the principal
implements a constant action proﬁle. However, because information is now public, the principal is
unable to oﬀer the pooling contract – the agent would not choose a when he observes one signal.
This means that she would prefer that information had been private.
Second, as ζ increases, the principal implements a non-constant action proﬁle at a lower value
of ζ than when she has private information because the cost of her separating contracts is lower,
but the expected revenues are the same as when she has private information. That is, ˆ ζPuI < ˆ ζPrI,
where ˆ ζPuI > 0.5 is the smallest value at which the principal is indiﬀerent between implementing
a constant versus a non-constant action proﬁle with public information.17 This lower cost of a
separating ex ante contract also implies that, for any value of ζ for which the principal is better
oﬀ by separating when she has private information, she certainly is better oﬀ by separating when
information is public.
We have then the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Private vs. Public Information
(a) If the principal implements a constant action proﬁle in Public Information with ζ > 0.5,
17Note also that the principal may implement a constant action proﬁle for some ζ > ˆ ζ
PuI.
17then she strictly prefers both Null Information and Private Information with ζ, to Public
Information.
(b) If the principal implements a non-constant action proﬁle in Private Information with ζ > 0.5,
then she strictly prefers Public Information with ζ to Private Information with ζ.
In other words, the principal: (i) would pay to keep her private information private if she would
implement a constant action proﬁle; (ii) would pay to acquire private information if and only if she
would implement a non-constant instead of a constant action proﬁle; and (iii) in that case, would
pay even more to share this information with the agent.
We are now ready to compare private versus public information about the technology. The
relative values of the payoﬀ functions determine the principal’s preference for private or public
information; the slopes of the payoﬀ functions determine her value of better private or public
information.
We extend Example 1 to public information:
Example 2 Non-Monotonic Value of Better Public Information
Let all primitives be the same as in Example 1. In Public Information, the principal optimally
implements:
• {a2,a2} for ζ ∈ [0.5, ˆ ζPuI] – her expected proﬁt monotonically decreases from 4159.19 to
4158.74;
• {a3,a2} for ζ ∈ [ˆ ζPuI,0.647] – her expected proﬁt increases to 4489.38; and
• {a3,a1} for ζ ∈ (0.647,1] – her expected proﬁt increases monotonically to 5410.33 at ζ = 1.
Figure 2 depicts the principal’s payoﬀ functions from Example 2. As before, the red, green,
and blue payoﬀ functions correspond to the action proﬁles {a2,a2}, {a3,a2}, and {a3,a1}; the solid
portions indicate the upper envelope of these payoﬀ functions. Note that: (i) ˆ ζPrI > ˆ ζPuI = 0.539;
(ii) although it is not optimal to implement {a3,a2} for ζ > 0.647, the payoﬀ function for this
action proﬁle is non-monotonic, increasing to 4704.00 at ζ = 0.82 and then decreasing to 4253.19
at ζ = 1; and (iii) the payoﬀ function for {a2,a2} is everywhere monotonically decreasing.
In Figure 3, the payoﬀ functions for each of the three action proﬁles are compared for Private
Information (brighter) and Public Information (darker). For ζ > ˆ ζPrI, though the principal prefers














Figure 2: Principal’s Payoﬀ Function With Public Information: Principal Pools for ζ ∈ [0.5, ˆ ζPuI)
Figure 3: Principal’s Payoﬀ Function With Private (brighter) vs. Public (darker) Information
(a) {a2,a2}






































Public to Private Information, the value of better information may be larger or smaller if it is
private than if it is public, since the signaling cost may increase or decrease. Moreover, comparing
the payoﬀ functions for ζ ∈ [0.5, ˆ ζPuI], the principal prefers Null to Public Information.
That is, the value of better public information may be negative for ζ near 0.5. If the principal
would want to implement diﬀerent actions depending upon the signal realization, then she strictly
prefers credibly sharing this signal with the agent; however, she may still have preferred that the
signal had been uninformative.
Previously, for a marginal increase in ζ when ζ = 0.5 we were unable to determine the directions
and magnitudes of the two eﬀects of the private signal being informative versus uninformative –
that due to better information for the principal versus that due to the induced asymmetry of
19information. We can now disentangle them: having private information is beneﬁcial if the principal
implements a constant action proﬁle because she is able to avoid the gamble on incentive provision;
however, having private information is harmful if the principal implements a non-constant action
proﬁle because she must alter one announcement-contingent contract in order to deter one of her
types from mimicking the other.
In other words, if with better information she still wants to pool, the marginal incentive infor-
mativeness is zero; if she cannot pool, as when information is public, then the marginal insurance
value is negative.
4 Robustness
In this section, taking the timing of contracting as given, we examine more closely the robustness
of the results to several assumptions. Particularly, we allow for the information structure to be
non-binary, the agent to have multiplicative utility, the principal to employ a mixed strategy upon
observing zk, and the players to renegotiate. Our results are robust to each of these extensions.
4.1 Non-Binary Information Structure
Suppose that there are more than two signals. Then, one could deﬁne better information as a
ranking of information structures in the sense of Blackwell. Additional signals do not remove the
ambiguous eﬀect of better information either on expected revenue or on expected cost – both with
private and with public information. Also, having additional signals does not aﬀect expected costs
with private or with public information in any way that alters this comparison.
With additional signals, the principal can now implement more than two actions, but, as before,
better information can increase her expected cost to implement an action given one signal, thereby
inducing her to implement a lower action upon observing that signal; if this happens, she would
receive less expected revenue.18
Now, consider the eﬀects on expected costs. With private information, the principal would still
be able to pool, but if she implements a non-constant action proﬁle, then she may have to adjust
the contracts to dissuade more than one type from mimicking; there is no reason a priori to suspect
18This is true whether these additional signals yield posterior probabilities that are between the “original” two or
more extreme than either.
20that if a “next-lower” type is unwilling to mimic, then “even-lower” types are unwilling to mimic.19
Therefore, better information may increase the signaling cost. Since the signaling cost need not be
monotonic, the value of better private information can still be non-monotonic.
With public information, the principal cannot ignore the signal; as before, if she implements a
constant action proﬁle, then she cannot pool and so would strictly prefer null or private to public
information. Additionally, the value of better public information can still be non-monotonic; at
least one cost of utility provision function increases, and, as in the previous analysis, this could lower
the principal’s proﬁt – although she still adjusts the expected utilities to equate the marginal costs
of utility provision, it remains possible that the expected cost of one or even each announcement-
contingent contract rises.
4.2 Multiplicative Utility
We have assumed that the agent’s utility is additively separable. If utility were multiplicative, the
results still hold because the proofs rely upon two factors that are still present with multiplicative
utility: the ability of the principal to trade oﬀ both incentive and utility provisions between the
announcement-contingent contracts, and her desire to do so due to the agent’s risk aversion.
Additionally, as the next example shows, the potential non-monotonicity in the value of better
information still exists. Gjesdal (1982, Propositions 2 and 3) showed that better information has
positive value if the agent’s utility is additively separable, but need not if utility is multiplicative.
In our model, the potential non-monotonicity in the value of information arises with additively
separable or multiplicative utility. Moreover, in Gjesdal’s model, better information does not induce
the principal to implement a lower action. In contrast, in our model, better information raises the
cost to implement any action other than a1 given one signal, possibly inducing the principal to
implement a lower action.20
Example 3 Non-Monotonic Value of Private Information with Multiplicative Utility
Let the primitives be the same as in Example 1 and Example 2 except: the agent’s utility is
ln(w)/a, a ∈ {1,2,5}, and q = {350,700,3000}. If information is:
Private then the principal optimally implements: {a2,a2} for ζ ∈ [0.5,0.669] – her expected proﬁt is
1081.38; {a3,a2} for ζ ∈ [0.669,0.922] – her expected proﬁt increases to 1122.55 at ζ = 0.87
19Since the type space does not satisfy the single-crossing property, there is no clear ranking of types.
20This also means that, compared with perfect information, the principal with ζ
′ is implementing a higher action.
21and then decreases to 1117.72 at ζ = 0.922; and {a3,a1} for ζ ∈ [0.922,1] – her expected
proﬁt increases to 1199.84;
Public then the principal optimally implements: {a3,a2} for ζ ∈ [0.5,0.670] – her expected proﬁt
increases from 1187.84 to 1203.65 (note that, with this action proﬁle, it reaches a maximum
of 1203.91 at ζ = 0.69 and then decreases to 1113.27 at ζ = 1); and {a3,a1} for ζ ∈ [0.670,1]
– her expected proﬁt monotonically increases to 1378.34.21
4.3 Mixed Strategy
Consider the non-monotonicity in the value of better private information.22 In other games, allowing
a player to play a mixed strategy may allow her to replicate the other player’s beliefs and thereby
receive the same expected payoﬀ. This is not the case in our ex ante contracting game. With better
information, even with a mixed strategy, (i) she is unable to replicate the agent’s beliefs unless both
PICkk′ and PICk′k bind, and (ii) even if she were, those contracts would almost certainly yield her
diﬀerent proﬁts since her types have changed. Thus, allowing her to play a mixed strategy does
not eliminate the non-monotonicity in the value of better information – i.e., it does not guarantee
a non-negative value of better information.
To see the ﬁrst, note that in any PBE, if the principal mixed upon observing zk but not upon
observing zk′, then when the principal announces zk, the agent knows that the principal observed
zk – i.e., ρag(k) = ρ
pr
k . Therefore, since better information changes ρ
pr
k , the same ex ante contract
may not be feasible. If, however, for ζ′, both principal-incentive compatibility constraints bind,
then the principal could mix upon observing zk and upon observing zk′. For ζ > ζ′, the principal
21Note the following regarding implementing {a2,a2} in Public Information: as with additive utility, her expected
proﬁt monotonically decreases (from 1081.38 to 1072.58), but, for ζ = 0.5, the principal gains by implementing a
non-constant action proﬁle. The latter result arises because: the ability to trade oﬀ utility provision enables her
to implement {a3,a2} at a lower cost than the average of the constant action proﬁles {a2,a2} and {a3,a3}, and
this cost savings is enough to induce her to implement a non-constant action proﬁle. This is akin to mixing, since
her expected conditional probability distributions are the same whether z1 or z2 is observed for ζ = 0.5. Note that
Gjesdal (1982) obtained a similar result when the agent’s utility is multiplicative – he showed that a random incentive
scheme can induce the agent to choose a higher action when his ﬁrst-order condition determining his optimal action
is convex in the payment. In our paper, the principal incentive compatibility constraints prevent her from doing this
if information is private.
22With public information, mixed strategies create a further complication because they cannot aﬀect the agent’s
beliefs; therefore, upon observing zk and selecting I(k
′), the agent may not choose a(z
′
k).
22can mix with diﬀerent probabilities and replicate the agent’s beliefs.
Nevertheless, doing so is almost certainly not optimal since the principal’s iso-proﬁt sets change
nonlinearly with better information. Moreover, optimization requires that the marginal costs of
utility provision for each announcement be equal at the utilities provided by each announcement-
contingent contract; however, in order for the principal to mix, and for this to be optimal, the two
announcement-contingent contracts must have the same expected proﬁt. Lastly, in Example 1, the
principal’s proﬁt decreases as ζ increases from 0.86 to 1; as checks, (i) PIC21 does not bind, and
(ii) the diﬀerence in P2’s expected proﬁt of I∗∗(2) and ˆ ˆ I(1) increases monotonically from 1742.27
at ζ = 0.86, to 2463.75 at ζ = 1.
4.4 Renegotiation
The ex ante contract is renegotiation-proof because the principal cannot gain except by providing
less utility to the agent. Each announcement-contingent contract minimizes the cost to implement
a∗∗(zk) while providing the agent expected utility u∗∗
k . The principal and agent would only rene-
gotiate if the principal could provide at least as much utility and implement a diﬀerent action that
makes her better oﬀ. However, the action speciﬁed in the ex ante contract is optimal.
Let Ck( ;ak,uk) denote the expected cost for the principal of the least-cost contract that im-
plements ak and provides the agent expected utility uk. To see that renegotiation is not fea-
sible, suppose that the principal considers implementing ˜ ak > a∗∗(zk). Because providing u∗∗
k
and implementing a∗∗(zk) is optimal in the ex ante contract, Ck( ;˜ ak,u∗∗
k ) − Ck( ;a∗∗(zk),u∗∗
k ) ≥
Bk(˜ ak) − Bk(a∗∗(zk)). For any ˜ u > u∗∗
k , Ck( ;˜ ak, ˜ u) > Ck( ;˜ ak,u∗∗
k ). Thus,
Bk(a∗∗(zk)) − Ck( ;a∗∗(zk),u∗∗
k ) ≥ Bk(˜ ak) − Ck( ;˜ ak,u∗∗
k ) > Bk(˜ ak) − Ck( ;˜ ak, ˜ u).
A similar analysis shows that the principal providing the agent more utility and implementing a
lower action makes her strictly worse oﬀ.
5 Discussion
We lastly consider the characteristics that are central to our framework, particularly the timing of
contracting and the importance of commitment.
As to the timing of contracting, ﬁrst for Public Information and Private Information, compare
23ex ante with ex post contracting (see Silvers, 2011).23 The agent, in Public Information, receives
exactly his reservation utility both with ex ante and with ex post contracting. In Private Infor-
mation, he receives exactly this with ex ante contracting, but can get more than this in ex post
contracting. The principal, on the other hand, prefers ex ante to ex post contracting in both Public
Information and Private Information; this follows because the ex post contracts constitute an ex
ante contract, but the principal can do better by trading oﬀ utility provision. Her preference is
strict unless either the primitives are such that the announcement-contingent contracts each provide
¯ U or she implements a constant action proﬁle with the pooling contract.24
Second, compare the values of information with ex ante against that with ex post contracting.
We can make four comparisons:
Null vs. Private With ex ante contracting, the principal weakly prefers Private to Null Information; with ex
post contracting, she may strictly prefer Private to Null Information, or vice versa;
Null vs. Public Both with ex ante and with ex post contracting, the principal prefers Public to Null Infor-
mation only if she implements a non-constant action proﬁle. If with ex post contracting she
prefers Public to Null Information, then she also does with ex ante contracting;
Private vs. Public Both with ex ante and with ex post contracting, if the principal implements a non-constant
action proﬁle in Private Information, then she prefers Public Information; however, if she
implements a constant action proﬁle in Public Information, then with ex ante contracting
she strictly prefers Private to Public Information, whereas with ex post contracting, she may
strictly prefer Private to Public Information or vice versa;
Better If the principal implements a constant action proﬁle in Private Information, then the value
of better private information is non-negative with ex ante, but may be negative with ex post
contracting. If she implements a non-constant action proﬁle in Private or Public Information,
then the value of better information can be positive or negative both with ex ante and with
ex post contracting. Lastly, both with ex ante and with ex post contracting, the value of
better private information can be greater or less than the value of better public information.
23In ex post contracting, the principal oﬀers the contract after zk is observed. As such, each contract she oﬀers
must provide the agent expected utility at least ¯ U.
24Even then, I
∗(λ) is only one possible equilibrium contract in Private Information with ex post contracting.
24As to commitment, the renegotiation-proofness of the ex ante contract implies that when one
player could gain by renegotiating, or exiting, the other player would lose. Thus, an important
requirement is that both players, once the agent accepts the contract, be committed. Without the
ability to commit, the situation is as in ex post contracting. In many examples, it is more diﬃcult
for the agent to commit.
Since the principal prefers ex ante to ex post contracting, and the agent has incentives to
renegotiate or exit for one announcement, our results can also be seen to add to the potential
losses to the principal and agent when the agent cannot commit. It also provides a reason why
the principal induces time consistency by the agent when commitment is not possible, or pays the
agent a fee to obtain his commitment.
Examples in which the agent is unable to commit include employment and insurance contracts.
In these situations, principals sometimes induce commitment, through for example, instilling a
worker with speciﬁc human capital or granting repeat customers discounts. An example in which
ﬁrms pay to contract before obtaining information is a ﬁrm that hires a professional on retainer.
The professional is obligated to work when and as the ﬁrm directs, and no particular case that
arises is known with certainty at the contracting date.
6 Conclusion
We have analyzed a principal-agent model with moral hazard in which neither player knows the
technology. A signal correlated with it is observed. We considered the possibilities that the signal
is uninformative, informative but only observed by the principal, and informative but observed
by both the principal and agent. Importantly, if the signal is observed before the agent chooses
his action, the principal can tailor the action to the signal; moreover, if it is observed after the
contracting date, the principal can alter the amounts of utility provided by each announcement-
contingent contract. We contrasted these situations and described the value of better information
in each.
We have shown that tailoring the actions to the signal may yield the principal less expected
revenue, and even if it yields her the same, the expected cost increases. These eﬀects are sensitive
to both the symmetry of information and the timing of information relative to the contract oﬀer.
Speciﬁcally, we have shown that when only the principal observes the signal, she prefers that it
is informative to that it is uninformative, with strict preference if she implements a non-constant
25action proﬁle; moreover, she would then further prefer that the agent also observes the signal.
However, when they both observe an informative signal, if she implements a constant action pro-
ﬁle, then she would prefer that it is uninformative – i.e, public information has negative value.
Additionally, the value of better information can be positive or negative.
One possible avenue to explore is to determine the properties of the technology that yield the
non-monotonicity. This could be clariﬁed by extending the model to other unknown parameters
that aﬀect the costs to implement an action, such as the agent’s disutility of action or reservation
utility. This would help determine, with ex ante contracting, which consequences of an unknown
technology are due to the timing of contracting versus the characteristics of the unknown parameter.
7 Appendix
7.1 Equilibria and Equilibrium Contracts
A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium must specify: (i) an ex ante contract that the principal oﬀers
and in Private Information an announcement by the principal; (ii) whether the agent accepts or
rejects the ex ante contract and actions for the agent to take; and (iii) beliefs both on and oﬀ the
equilibrium path.
Both the principal and the agent have a common prior, λ, that the principal has Π1. The
principal forms her posterior beliefs after observing zk. If the principal has private information,
then the agent forms posterior beliefs after learning the principal’s announcement; if information
is public, then the agent forms his posterior beliefs after observing zk. These beliefs follow Bayes’
rule. Finally, beliefs for all other possible contracts and possible announcements must be speciﬁed,
though they are not restricted.
In ex ante contracting, the principal oﬀers a contract that is a menu of announcement-contingent
contracts, each of which speciﬁes a payment for each possible outcome. When information is private,
the ex ante contract may be pooling or separating. It is pooling if the announcement-contingent
contracts are identical. If it is separating, then each announcement-contingent contract must be
incentive compatible for the principal. Note that no other deviations are possible – once the
principal has oﬀered, and the agent accepted, an ex ante contract, her announcement determines
the operative announcement-contingent contract.
The agent’s acceptance/rejection decision depends upon whether the contract is individually
26rational, which requires that (2) holds. The agent’s action choice maximizes his expected utility, so
that he chooses a if and only if (1) holds. Note that incentive compatibility for the agent depends
upon the agent’s posterior belief.
• Public Information
The principal can oﬀer the ex ante contract {I∗(1),I∗(2)} where I∗(1) implements a(z1) and
I∗(2) implements a(z2), but may do better by trading oﬀ utility provision. Note that I∗(λ) is
not feasible since it does not implement a when one signal is observed. The optimal contract
is denoted {I∗∗(1),I∗∗(2)}.
• Private Information
Pooling and separating contracts are both possible. Because the principal has private infor-
mation, the ex ante contract must induce the principal to truthfully announce her signal.
Suppose, without loss of generality, that PIC12 holds with strict equality if I∗(1) were part
of the ex ante contract but PIC21 holds with strict inequality. For some other action proﬁle,
it could be that PIC21 holds with strict equality.
The principal can oﬀer the ex ante contract {ˆ I(1),I∗(2)}, where ˆ I(1) implements a(z1) and
I∗(2) implements a(z2), but may do better by trading oﬀ utility provision.
If the principal implements a constant action proﬁle, then, by (5), the principal oﬀers {I∗(λ),I∗(λ)};











where ˆ ˆ I(1) implements a(z1), I∗∗(2) implements a(z2), and together they satisfy (2) and
PIC12.
• Null Information
If the principal implements a constant action proﬁle, then the ex ante contract is {I∗(λ),I∗(λ)}.
If, on the other hand, she implements a non-constant action proﬁle, then the ex ante contract
is {I∗∗(1),I∗∗(2)} as in Public Information, where I∗∗(k) implements a∗∗(zk) and together
they satisfy (2); consequently, in our comparisons, we consider that the principal implements
a constant action proﬁle in Null Information.
277.2 Proofs
In the proofs, let pn(a;λ) denote pn(a;k) when ρ
pr





n=1 pn(a;λ)In for some I that implements a.




n=1 pn(a(zk);k′)In(k) denote Pk′’s expected cost if she oﬀers I(k) which implements
a(zk).
Because the ex ante contract would not be renegotiated (see Section 4.4), the solution to (3)
is equivalent to the solutions to the following programs, for both k (where the principal-incentive










pn(a(zk);k)V (In(k)) − a(zk) ≥ u∗∗
k ,
(1) with ρag = ρ
pr
k ,and
Bk′(a(zk′)) − Ck′(I∗∗(k′);a(zk′)) ≥ Bk′(a(zk)) − c∗∗
k′k ∀k′  = k.
(6)
To see this, form the Lagrangian from the program for both possible zk and add them together.
The value of these summed Lagrangians is the same as the value of the Lagrangian in the initial
program (3). Moreover, if  k is the Lagrange multiplier on the promised utility constraint in (6)
and   is the Lagrange multiplier on the individual rationality constraint in (3), then  k =  .
The program given by (6) for each possible signal shows that as long as the  k are not equal the
principal can adjust an announcement-contingent contract to reduce her cost and reduce the agent’s
utility. Each  k, equal to   at the solution to (3), is the marginal cost of utility provision at the
current announcement-contingent contract. If the agent receives more than ¯ U from some ex ante
contract, then the principal can adjust one or both announcement-contingent contracts by lowering
the payments, and thereby the expected utility from that announcement-contingent contract and
thus of the ex ante contract. This is possible as long as the minimum payment associated with
each announcement-contingent contract is greater than w.




n(1)) − a = ¯ U and
 N
n=1 pn(a;2)V (I∗
n(2)) − a = ¯ U, so that
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n(2)) − prob(z2)a = ¯ U.
In addition, ∀˜ a,
 N
n=1(pn(a;1)−pn(˜ a;1))V (I∗




a − ˜ a, so that
prob(z1)
  N  
n=1





  N  
n=1




prob(z1)(a − ˜ a) + prob(z2)(a − ˜ a) = a − ˜ a.
Thus, an announcement-contingent contract that gives the agent I∗
n(1) with probability prob(z1)pn(a;1)
and I∗
n(2) with probability prob(z2)pn(a;2), when summed over all possible outcomes, would give
the agent exactly his reservation utility and would implement a. But, I∗(λ) that implements a is
the least-cost contract among those that satisfy individual rationality and incentive compatibility
if ρag = λ.
Proof of Proposition 1.
Simple algebra shows that expected revenues are the same – that is, Bλ(a) = prob(z1)B1(a) +
prob(z2)B2(a). Thus, we only need to focus on the costs.
In Private Information, if the principal implements the same action, then her expected cost is
necessarily Cλ(I∗(λ);a), the same as it is in Null Information.
If better information induces her to implement diﬀerent actions, then
prob(z1)
 







Bλ(˜ a) − Cλ(I∗(λ);˜ a),
where a(z1)  = a(z2) and ˜ a may equal a(z1) or a(z2) or neither. {ˆ I(1),I∗(2)} is feasible; however,
the principal can be better oﬀ with {ˆ ˆ I(1),I∗∗(2)}.
29Proof of Proposition 2.
As the principal implements a both given z1 and given z2 with ζ′, where I∗(λ) implements a,
{I∗(λ),I∗(λ)} is the equilibrium ex ante contract since this is the least-expensive contract that
implements a for each signal and provides the agent ¯ U.
Let ζ > ζ′. If with ζ, the principal implements the same action proﬁle, then she does so with








B2|ζ(a(z2)) − C2|ζ(I∗∗(2 | ζ);a(z2))
 
>
Bλ(˜ a) − Cλ(I∗(λ);˜ a),
where a(z1)  = a(z2) and ˜ a may equal a(z1) or a(z2) or neither. She is necessarily better oﬀ since
the same ex ante contract is feasible.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Consider part (a). As with the ﬁrst part of the proof of Proposition 1, the principal’s equilibrium





1 to 0 and 1 increases the principal’s cost to implement a given action. Each ex ante
contract provides the same utility, but the ex ante contract in Public Information is a mean-utility
preserving increase in risk of the ex ante contract in Null Information. That is, the agent would be
indiﬀerent between getting I∗
n(λ) with probability pn(a;λ) for all n, and having the gamble I∗
n(1)
with probability λpn(a;1) and I∗
n(2) with probability (1 − λ)pn(a;2). The agent’s risk aversion
implies that this second gamble is more costly than the ﬁrst.
For part (b), because the principal implements a non-constant action proﬁle in Private Infor-
mation, the ex ante contract is necessarily separating. In Public Information, she could implement
the same actions and thereby receive the same expected revenue, but at a strictly lower cost since
I(1) and I(2) do not have to satisfy the additional principal incentive compatibility constraint, at
least one of which binds. If she implements a diﬀerent action proﬁle in Public Information than
she does in Private Information, then she is strictly better oﬀ.
Finally, since she could implement the same action in Private Information and be equally well
30oﬀ as in Null Information, but she implements a non-constant action proﬁle, she must strictly prefer
the former to the latter.
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